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This book is a  defence of substance dualism (that we human beings 
consist of two parts, body – a contingent part, and soul -the one essential 
part), and of libertarian free will (that we are not always fully caused to 
form our intentions), from which it follows that we are often morally 
responsible for our actions. But in order to establish these points I need 
to introduce some crucial terminology, and to defend some general 
theories of metaphysics and epistemology.
So in chapter 1 I  distinguish three kinds of thing: substances (the 
constituents of the world such as electrons, planets, and houses), their 
properties (such as weighing 1000kg, or being spherical), and events 
(occurrences at particular times, which consist in substances having 
or changing their properties); and I argue that the history of the world 
(in an  objective sense) just is all the events that happen. In order to 
tell that history we must pick out substances, etc., by what I call their 
‘informative designators’, which (roughly) are rigid designators such that 
if someone knows what the word means, they will know the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for its application. Thus ‘red’ is an informative 
(rigid) designator, but ‘water’ as used in the eighteenth century is 
an  uninformative designator, because speakers then did not know 
the essence of water. We should count two substances (or whatever) 
the same substance (or whatever) iff their informative designators are 
logically equivalent. Then a  proposition is metaphysically necessary/
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possible/impossible iff it is logically necessary/possible/impossible when 
we substitute coreferring informative designators for any uninformative 
designators. In chapter 2 I consider what makes a belief that a certain 
event occurred or that a certain scientific theory is true, or that some 
assertion is possibly true, a justified belief in the sense of a belief which 
is probably true on the evidence available to the believer. I defend the 
principle of credulity, that every basic belief is probably true in the 
absence of contrary evidence (that is, a defeater); and I apply it to the 
justification of our beliefs about logical modalities, our beliefs resulting 
from experience, memory, and testimony, and our beliefs about the 
probable truth of scientific theories. I claim that it is a defeater to any 
belief resulting from experience, memory, or testimony that the event 
purportedly experienced, remembered or testified to did not cause the 
resulting belief.
I then apply these results in chapters 3 to 7, to examine the relation 
of our life of thought and feeling to what happens in our brains and so 
in our bodies. I argue in chapter 3 that there are two kinds of event in 
the world: physical events (including brain events) and mental events. 
Mental events are events to which the subject (the person whose 
events they are) has privileged access, that is a way of knowing about 
them not available to others. Among mental events are pure mental 
events, ones which do not include any physical event. Among these are 
beliefs, thoughts, intentions, desires and sensations, events of which the 
subject is often conscious and which are then conscious events. Given 
that events are individuated by informative designators, it then follows 
that pure mental events are not the same as physical events and do not 
(metaphysically) supervene on them. I go on in Chapter 4 to argue that 
not merely do brain events often cause mental events, but mental events 
(and in particular intentions) often cause brain events, and thereby bodily 
movements. Many neuroscientists have interpreted the results of recent 
neuroscientific experiments as showing that our pure mental events (and 
in particular our intentions) never cause brain events. I argue that these 
results do not show that, and that no experimental evidence of any kind 
could possibly show that, because in order to show that we would need 
evidence about our pure mental events which – given the principles 
about memory and testimony cited above – could only be obtained on 
the assumption that those events do cause brain events.
In chapter 5 I argue that this result that our intentions often cause 
our brain events needs to be expressed more carefully as the result that 
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persons often cause brain events when they intentionally cause bodily 
movements. The view deriving from Hume holds that the causes of events 
are other events, logically distinct from them; for example that when 
the ignition of dynamite causes an explosion, the ignition is a separate 
event from the explosion, and the first event causing the second one 
consists in there being a  law of nature (a consequence of fundamental 
laws) which determines that an  event of the first kind is followed by 
an event of the second kind. I now argue that whatever might be the case 
with non-intentional causation (e.g. the ignition of gunpowder causing 
an  explosion, or a  brain event causing pain), in intentional causation 
the cause is the person whose intention it is, a  substance and not 
an event. A person having an intention (in acting) is simply that person 
intentionally exercising causal power. In chapter 6 I move on to the issue 
of the nature of the substance, the human person to whom pure mental 
events (including intentions) belong. I  argue that each human person 
can pick out themselves by an informative designator (e.g., ‘I’), whereas 
others can only pick out a person by an uninformative designator – since 
each of us knows the necessary and sufficient conditions for being 
who we are, and others do not. Hence since it is logically possible that 
I should exist without a body, it is also metaphysically possible. Each of 
us is a pure mental substance, having a soul as their one essential part 
and a body as a non-essential part; physical properties belong to us in 
virtue of belonging to our bodies, and pure mental properties belong to 
us in virtue of belonging to our souls.
Given that human persons cause brain events, the next issue is 
whether humans are always fully caused to cause the brain events they 
often do cause (and so the resulting bodily movements) by earlier brain 
events or mental events. I argue in Chapter 7 that it is most improbable 
that it could be shown that we are always so caused – since any purported 
laws of mind/brain interaction would be so complicated that it would be 
almost impossible to get enough evidence to establish or refute them. 
Hence when it seems to us that we are causing our bodily movements 
(and so the brain events which cause them) without being fully caused to 
do so, we should – by the principle of credulity – believe that that is how 
it is, and so that we have (in this crucial sense) free will. I then proceed 
to argue in Chapter 8 that, given that that is our situation, we are morally 
responsible for our actions – guilty and deserving blame for doing what 
we believe wrong, meritorious and deserving praise for doing what we 
believe to be good actions beyond obligation.
